vaster field of operations nothing was proved. But his brilliant record at Verdun and our knowledge of his intellectual quality led us to look for-

Nivelle's ward to a fresh survey, by a fresh mind

war record unhampered by commitments or traditions, of the possibilities of the vast battlefield of the War. Thus might be discovered some wall in the rampart that compassed the Central Powers more vulnerable than the bastion which had so far defied every effort made to reduce it or break through, by the strongest armies and the most formidable machines of the Allies. Our expectations were doomed to disappointment. There is no evidence that General Nivelle gave a thought to any front except the one where he was to command.

Concerned Unfortunately the French Government,

French Front instead of putting him in charge of the whole War—as for all practical purposes was Joffre—limited his sphere to the command of the French Army operating in France. The other fronts were for him " out of bounds " for study and action. When invited to consider other possibilities, he dismissed every suggestion with a curt and peremptory refusal even to enter into a discussion on the subject. It was not his affair, except to the extent that operations on any other battlefield involved a depletion of the resources at his disposal for his own sector of the ' vast circumvallation. Any project or strategy that took guns and men away from the Armies

under his direction must be discouraged. Epauletted egoism is impenetrable to the assault of ideas. The battle front where the *Generalissimo* commanded—there was the War. Every other front or flank was a " side-show.[35] How in 1917 that infatuation led the French Army to the brink of irreparable catastrophe,